Throughout history, medical practitioners have been admonished to do nothing in treating their patients that might result in harming them. It was not until the 20th century that such teaching was codified in specific legislation. Spurred on by the perversity of Nazi doctors during the Holocaust, world leaders produced the Nuremberg Code in 1947 and the Declaration of Helsinki in 1964. Revelations about other egregious acts in the guise of legitimate medical research led to other measures to prevent such mistreatment. Regulations to ensure physician competency and responsibility have mushroomed in the succeeding years. While such measures were coming into being, some of the greatest advances in medicine were being achieved, not least among them those in cardiovascular surgery. Ironically, much of this valuable research would likely not have been approved under regulatory measures now firmly in place. Given the nature of medical research, more often than not a certain degree of risk in all patients entering such trials may be unavoidable. There is always a balance to be maintained between risk and potential benefit. Saving lives, not sacrificing them: the inevitable clash between medical research and the protection of medical subjects Allen B. Weisse, MD T he 20th century was characterized by an incomparable advance of medical knowledge. Importantly, much of this could be directly applied to the quality of patient care provided in our hospitals and clinics. Patients suff ering from infectious diseases, cancer, and cardiovascular disease, as well as other maladies, were all benefi ciaries of such research. Coincident with such progress was the need to have patients participate in studies in order to evaluate the validity of new treatments. With this came the responsibility to ensure the protection and rights of both the patients and normal volunteers involved.
Th e Nuremberg Code was adopted in 1947 primarily in reaction to the horrors infl icted upon many innocent victims of the Holocaust. However, other medical scandals involving patients and volunteers were being uncovered, including the study of untreated syphilis in African American men and human radiation experiments. In recognition of this, the scope of the Nuremberg Code and, later, the Declaration of Helsinki (1964) was widened to include all types of patient involvement in medical research. How vigorously, in practice, such guidelines were followed was and still is of major concern. Some insight into this compliance may be gained by examining some procedures developed in one of the major areas of groundbreaking research during this period, cardiovascular surgery (1, 2).
LIGATION OF A PATENT DUCTUS ARTERIOSUS
Th e ductus arteriosus is a connection between the aorta and pulmonary artery that functions normally in utero when the lungs are collapsed. It closes soon after delivery as the lungs expand and the normal postpartum circulation is established. Failure to close results in a shunting of blood from the systemic to the pulmonary circulation, causing cardiac enlargement with symptoms often occurring in early childhood and death occurring at the average age of 24 years as a result of intractable heart failure or infection.
In 1938, Robert E. Gross was the 33-year-old chief surgical resident at the Children's Hospital in Boston and the Peter Bent Brigham Hospital. In addition to his surgical training, he had completed 3 years of training in pathology. He had become familiar with the pathological anatomy of many congenital cardiac abnormalities and later observed a number of children suff ering from patent ductus. Th ese experiences convinced him that he could successfully ligate this abnormally patent communication (3-5). Others were not so convinced that this could be done without unacceptable risk, among them William Ladd, Gross's chief, who had specifi cally turned down this request of his resident.
Despite this, Gross waited for Ladd to be away from Boston before scheduling two children for the procedure. Apparently unaware that an attempt at ligation had been unsuccessful elsewhere at this time, Gross moved ahead. On August 26, 1938 , he operated successfully upon a 7½-year-old girl and, soon after, the second patient who had been held in reserve. Ladd was on the high seas, en route to Europe at the time. When he returned he fi red Gross, but later rehired him as news of this important achievement spread. Gross became, in essence, the fi rst cardiac surgeon in the United States and had a very successful career thereafter.
THE SURGICAL TREATMENT OF MITRAL STENOSIS
An end result of rheumatic fever in some patients involves damage to the heart valves. Most commonly it is the mitral valve that is involved; most commonly it is a narrowing (stenosis) of the valve opening that occurs (mitral stenosis; MS). Early in the 20th century, even in industrialized countries of the West, many patients suff ered from this condition with no eff ective treatment available. Although it now seems obvious that such an obstruction of the mitral valve could be the source of disability, medical authorities of the time held that the main problem was in the heart muscle and any changes in valve morphology were only incidental. Nonetheless, a few physicians believed that such valvular changes could account for the patients' symptoms and that these changes might be paramount (6) . In MS they held that surgical relief of the obstruction could provide signifi cant relief.
As early as 1923, Elliott C. Cutler in Boston had operated on an 11-year-old girl who improved postoperatively and survived an additional 4½ years before succumbing to her disease. Th is initial success was followed by repeated failures. In 1929, Cutler and Claude Beck reviewed the results in 10 cases of MS worldwide with only two showing any improvement. Th e rest died while in surgery or shortly thereafter. A moratorium on mitral surgery followed until the 1940s. Th en, between 1944 and 1948, four diff erent men in four diff erent locations began to succeed in their attack on the stenotic mitral valve. Th ese were Dwight E. Harken in Boston; Charles P. Bailey in Philadelphia; Horace G. Smithy in Charleston, South Carolina; and Russell C. Brock in London. Th eir approaches were either through the left atrium or the left ventricular apex, but either technique seemed to work.
Th e personalities of these four surgeons diff ered as much as their locations. But while Harken, Smithy, and Brock seemed safely ensconced in their respective academic homes, Bailey more often came across as a loner and a maverick. Some even considered him "a loose cannon." Bailey was born in Neptune, New Jersey, in very modest circumstances and after completing medical school spent 5 years in general practice before even starting his surgical training at Hahnemann (7). Perhaps he felt a greater need than other surgeons with more impressive backgrounds to assert himself.
He was drawn to the problem of MS after having witnessed, as a boy, his father dying from the disease, and once he had set as his goal the conquering of MS he could not be defl ected from it. Eff orts to do so at Hahnemann fell on deaf ears. Th e professor of cardiology called Bailey and informed him that, as a physician, he felt it was his Hippocratic duty to oppose him. He added that he felt it was his Christian duty to prevent Bailey from performing any more of these procedures. Characteristically, Bailey replied that he felt that he was a victim of "the jury being out before the court had been called into session." He affi rmed his belief in the path he was taking and considered it his Christian duty to forge ahead.
Bailey was soon denied operating privileges in three of the fi ve hospitals where he had been on staff . Time was running out; he had already lost three patients, and any further failures would be the end of him. Reminiscent of Gross, he scheduled two patients, one in the morning at the Philadelphia General Hospital and one in the afternoon at the Episcopal Hospital. At this point Bailey contracted measles and had to wait a month before putting his plan into action. Th e fi rst patient died but the second survived and improved. Th e crisis of confi dence had passed and, with other favorable results being reported by his three colleagues, mitral commissurotomy, as the procedure was to be called, became common.
After this period Bailey developed surgical approaches to other cardiac diseases, but none had the impact of the MS work. When he fi nally gave up his surgical practice he earned a law degree at Fordham University and then joined a fi rm specializing in physicians' problems. Later he founded a nonprofi t insurance company. But the problem of valvular heart disease found him once again, in a very personal way. He developed aortic stenosis, to which he succumbed in 1993 at the age of 82.
REFUTING INTERNAL MAMMARY ARTERY LIGATION FOR CORONARY HEART DISEASE
As great a problem as valvular heart disease was that of coronary artery disease. In the years before coronary artery bypass grafting became the standard surgical treatment for this, a number of indirect methods of questionable effi cacy were attempted. One that, briefl y, seemed to hold promise was that of bilateral internal mammary artery ligation, especially for severe angina. Th e hypothesis in support of this procedure was that, in the presence of coronary artery obstruction, collaterals would develop from the internal mammary arteries to relieve ischemia of the myocardium at risk. It was believed that this process could be enhanced by ligation of the internal mammary arteries with the backup of blood fl ow redirected to these collaterals to the heart.
In 1955 a group of Italian investigators reported their preliminary fi ndings regarding this technique (8) . Before clinical application, they performed postmortem studies in coronary patients using injections of radiopaque material, methylene blue, or india ink in the mammary arteries to demonstrate any collaterals. In addition, studies were performed in dogs to demonstrate the presence of these vessels. Although neither of these studies demonstrated collaterals to the myocardium, the investigators proceeded to perform the operation in 11 patients diagnosed as having severe angina at rest or with minimal exertion. Four of these patients had suff ered previous myocardial infarctions.
Th e initial results were spectacular: all were completely free of chest pain postoperatively. Improved electrocardiogram patterns were seen in fi ve. Follow-up in all but one patient was limited to 1 to 3 months. By 1959 they reported their results in 304 patients followed from 6 months to 4 years (9). Symptomatic improvement (fair to excellent) was found in 90%, with 5% regressing over the period of observation. Th ey recommended this simple and eff ective procedure as an alternative to other more complicated indirect surgical procedures proposed for the treatment of coronary artery disease.
Such results, if valid, might off er relief to thousands upon thousands of coronary patients throughout the world. Th e question that remained in the minds of some critics was how much of this symptomatic improvement could be related to a placebo eff ect.
Two groups of American investigators put this question to the test. Leonard Cobb and his colleagues selected 17 patients with angina (10) . Th e patients were told only "that they were participating in an evaluation of this procedure; they were not aware of the double-blind nature of the study." Surgery involved exposure of the internal mammary arteries under local anesthesia. At this point the surgeon was handed a randomly selected envelope which indicated whether or not to proceed with the ligations before closing the chest incisions. A similar study was performed by E. Grey Dimond and associates (11) . Patients were randomly selected for the ligation or no-ligation group during surgery, and in follow up "neither the cardiologists nor the patients knew which operative procedure had been performed." Specifi c information regarding informed consent was not mentioned by the authors.
On follow-up, Cobb found subjective improvement in only 32% of those undergoing ligations and 43% of those who received sham operations (10). Dimond noted immediate improvement of chest pain in 15 patients, including 5 patients with sham operations (11) . Exercise tolerance was not improved among patients with ligations (10). Despite subjective improvement of chest pain, electrocardiographic changes of ischemia on exercise persisted postoperatively (11) . Th e placebo eff ect was clearly recognized, and the procedure was discarded.
OPEN-HEART SURGERY
Th e success of mitral commissurotomy emphasized the fact that only a small portion of the various congenital and acquired heart diseases potentially amenable to surgical treatment were being addressed. What was obvious was that most of these diseases could only be surgically approached by opening the heart to perform repairs in a blood-free fi eld. What was needed was a machine to receive all the venous blood returning to the heart, oxygenate it, and then return it to the arterial circulation. Lacking this, surgeons attempted other methods to achieve their goals.
At the University of Minnesota, hypothermia was used to close an atrial septal defect by F. John Lewis in 1953, with the technique pursued by others, most notably Henry Swan (12) . However, the technique was applicable to only a limited number of abnormalities and required repair in 6 minutes or less to avoid damage to the patient. Also at Minnesota at the time, C. Walton Lillehei and his team adopted their own approach to the problem. Much as they did in the dog laboratory, they decided to use a normal donor, in this case usually a parent with the same blood type as the patient, to serve as the pump-oxygenator. Criticized as the only operation with possibly 200% mortality, Lillehei's cross-circulation operation was remarkably successful. Th eir results in a 30-year follow-up were impressive (13) . Among 45 patients operated upon between March 1954 and July 1955, there were only 8 hospital deaths and 2 late deaths.
No donors died or were incapacitated except for one who suffered a cerebral air embolism due to an error by an attending anesthesiologist.
Th e need for this and other less ideal approaches ended in May 1953 when, after many years of eff ort, John Gibbon performed the fi rst successful repair of an atrial septal defect with the pump-oxygenator he had developed (14) . However, he was unable to repeat this success in the next two patients and abandoned the fi eld. A few scattered attempts were made at various institutions with other versions of this apparatus, but the technique could not be fi rmly accepted unless a series of patients with successful operations could be reported. John Kirklin and his associates at the Mayo Clinic were determined to correct this defi ciency. Using a modifi cation of the Gibbon apparatus, they performed open-heart surgery in eight patients (15) . Th e series was small and the mortality, at 50%, high. Was the glass half empty or half full? Th e medical community decided that the results were promising, and the era of open-heart surgery had begun in earnest.
CARDIAC TRANSPLANTATION
Th e world was enthralled by the report from Groote Schuur Hospital in Cape Town, South Africa, that on December 3, 1967, Christiaan Barnard had performed the fi rst successful human cardiac transplantation (16, 17) . Th e patient, Louis Washkansky, lived 18 days after recovering from surgery. His death was probably due to infection rather than rejection, but it was the latter that was soon on everyone's mind after dismal experiences with kidney transplantation due to this phenomenon. Barnard's second patient, Philip Blaiberg, survived 19 months, providing hope that the problem of rejection might not be as severe as had been found with the kidney. Perhaps the heart was less immunogenic than the kidney? Perhaps the antirejection drugs might be more eff ective in the heart? Perhaps if they just did enough of these procedures surgeons could ascend the learning curve to achieve truly acceptable results?
Over the next year and a half, hundreds of patients were subjected to the procedure with uniform failure following. One discouraged physician associated with a particularly active surgical team likened what they were doing to manslaughter. Finally a general moratorium was put in place until cyclosporine arrived on the scene in the 1970s (18) . Despite the success achieved with this drug, only 2000 or so transplantations have been performed annually since it was introduced. Th ere simply are not enough donor hearts available for the thousands upon thousands of patients with end-stage heart failure awaiting relief.
THE TOTAL ARTIFICIAL HEART
Despite the great advances in the surgical treatment of heart disease, a major problem continues to persist: fi nding an eff ective treatment for intractable heart failure. An ideal solution would be a mechanical heart that could be easily implanted, free of complications, long lasting, and capable of providing the recipient with a good quality of life. Although experimental work on such a device had begun in earnest as early as the 1950s, the fi rst clinical application of the total artifi cial heart was performed on April 4, 1969, by Denton Cooley in Houston, Texas (19) (20) (21) .
Perhaps no innovation in the history of cardiac surgery aroused as much controversy as the artifi cial heart. Cooley and his associate, Domingo Liotta, used a device similar to that developed by Liotta while working in Michael DeBakey's laboratory. Th e patient, Haskell Karp, died 37 hours postoperatively from infection believed secondary to immunosuppressant drugs. On the day of surgery, DeBakey was out of town, and he did not learn of the procedure until after it was completed. He had resisted the use of the total artifi cial heart in humans, commenting, "Up to then no animal in which we had implanted the heart had survived beyond 48 hours" (22) . If you could not keep a healthy calf alive with the device, how could you expect good results in a patient with advanced heart failure?
Regardless of the merit of performing such a procedure, Cooley had violated the guidelines of the National Institutes of Health research grants. Any new procedure on humans had to be approved by the head of the research program (DeBakey), the human research committee at Baylor College of Medicine, and the National Institutes of Health. Cooley went ahead without receiving any such approvals. Although many physicians admired Cooley's ability and may have even sympathized with his position, others felt that, whatever his motivation, Cooley had acted illegally. Years later in an in-depth review of the issue, with which Cooley, unlike DeBakey, had declined to participate, Cooley was deemed at fault (23) .
Cooley has always maintained that he was acting in his patient's best interest, the primary responsibility of the physician (21; personal communication, June 13, 2013) . He has noted that the quality of surgery performed in the animal laboratory was hardly equivalent to what he performed. Postoperative care in the laboratory, especially back in 1969, was not equal to that available today. He denied knowing of DeBakey's whereabouts on the day of surgery and, even if he did, he would have proceeded, within his rights as the director of the Texas Heart Institute.
In July 1981 he performed a second implant, this time with Tetsuzo Akutsu, a pioneer in this kind of research, who was at the Texas Heart Institute at the time. Th e result was similar to that of Karp. In both patients they described these attempts as bridges to cardiac transplantation when donor hearts became available.
In 1984 a total artifi cial heart was permanently implanted in a patient, Barney Clark, by William DeVries at the University of Utah in Salt Lake City (24) . Working closely with him on this eff ort was Willem S. Kolff , who had been working on this problem for decades, and Robert K. Jarvik, designer of the artifi cial heart employed. Clark experienced multiple and predominantly thromboembolic sequelae and died 112 days after a diffi cult postoperative course. Later attempts at this kind of surgery by DeVries and others were all plagued by similar problems. Despite such disheartening results, some surgeons have continued to use the device with some degree of success. Jack Copeland, for example, has demonstrated that using an artifi cial heart as a bridge to cardiac transplantation can result in signifi cant increases in survival time to transplantation and improved survival after transplantation (25) . Kolff , in his remaining years, maintained his enthusiasm for the total artifi cial heart and felt that its ultimate success only required better design and better medical management. In the meantime, left ventricular assist devices and occasionally right ventricular assist devices are providing some relief to patients with advanced heart failure, and attempts to develop animal models (pigs) that do not provoke immune reaction are undergoing study.
DISCUSSION
Even with this limited review consisting of only a handful of examples, there is much to ponder. What does it tell us about the diff erent ways in which advances in research come about? What does it reveal about the kinds of individuals engaging in such research? What infl uence did the profession's mores at the time have on the conduct of research? How would current standards of patient-based research have aff ected such attempts?
Th e value of some surgical innovations becomes apparent very early in the game. Successful ligation of the persistently patent ductus arteriosus was achieved on the fi rst attempt by Gross and with equal success with his second patient. More often than not, however, in developing a new surgical technique initial attempts fail. Only after multiple additional surgeries, with lessons learned along the way, is success fi nally achieved. Th is certainly applied to the case of mitral stenosis when, it seemed, a critical tipping point had to be reached at several centers before the goal was obtained. Th is phenomenon is not limited to cardiovascular research. Willem Kolff , inventor of the fi rst workable artifi cial kidney, never tired of telling how only one of the fi rst 15 patients he treated survived, with that single success probably related to factors other than his receiving dialysis.
Assuming that a critical number of procedures must be reached to ensure success can lead researchers astray, as in the case of cardiac transplantation, where hundreds of patients were, in a sense, sacrifi ced while the problem of rejection continued to plague their doctors. Th e acceptance of open-heart surgery using the pump-oxygenator depended upon the conviction that even a 50% survival gave reason to hope for better things to come.
What about the surgeons and their medical colleagues who persist in such endeavors? What really motivates them? Money does not seem to have been a goal, although some surgeons have accumulated wealth as a result of the kind of services they provided. What does seem evident among such individuals is a kind of compulsion bordering on the monomaniacal to pursue their goals. How else to account for John Gibbon's working on a heartlung machine for about two decades, beginning in the 1930s and culminating in his fi rst and only success in 1953? Th e responses of other surgeons follow a similar pattern. Charles Bailey, never at a loss for words, expressed his own feelings as follows:
Finally, however, you have to face "the moment of truth," and the poignancy is so great that I can't really express it. You know that almost all the world is against it; you know that you have a great personal stake and might even lose your medical license, or at least your hospital privileges, if you persist. In fact the thought crosses your mind that maybe you really are crazy. And yet you feel that it has to be done and that it must be right (26) .
What some might view as devious-the scheduling of patients by Gross and Cooley-could well have been motivated by such strong beliefs in the rightness of their cause.
Th e task of monitoring such eff orts, as complex and unpredictable as they are, is daunting. What seems to have evolved from a relatively circumscribed set of rules to prevent abuse and guide the use of patients and other research volunteers is a burgeoning body of regulations apparently increasingly based on the presumption of physicians' lack of responsibility and inclination toward ethical error. In this view, unless closely supervised and observed, physicians might not be relied upon to maintain or improve their skills, keep abreast of new developments, or even relate to their patients in a humane, caring way.
Th e Nuremberg Code (1947) and the Declaration of Helsinki (1964) were clearly dedicated to patients' rights. Th e Belmont Report (1970) codifi ed such issues, including the establishment of institutional review boards. Subsequent legislation and regulations, some of them even initiated by organized medicine, have, in practice, focused more on physician behavior. Th e Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (1996) was a major step in this direction. Added to this over the years has been the growth of specialty certifi cation and recertifi cation, not always with clear intent or determined outcome (27) . Physicians who traditionally attended medical meetings of all kinds wholeheartedly are now required to prove it through documented continuing medical education credits for licensure and staff privileges. Work hour restrictions for housestaff have been imposed without any evaluation of benefi t or loss due to the various factors involved. Th e latest wrinkle in the oversight onslaught in some states is proof of "cultural competence," without which licensure may not be renewed.
Under the present system of supervision, it is unlikely that many of the successful surgical innovations we have witnessed would have been achieved. Would Gross or Cooley have dared their innovations, depending only on an understanding between them and the families involved? Would Bailey and the other pioneers of mitral valve surgery have been allowed to proceed? Would Lillehei have been permitted to use his patients' parents as "pumpoxygenators"? Would Kirklin and his counterparts elsewhere in the United States have been permitted to continue performing open-heart surgery with such high mortality rates?
Much mention is made of the balance between risk and benefi t in research. Th e problem is that, in practice, neither risk nor benefi t can easily be assessed until after the fact. Th e men and women now empowered to make such judgments face a diffi cult task in choosing the right path to follow. Th e enactment of yet another set of regulations is unlikely to steer them along it. We can only hope that a little less hubris and a little more humility will guide them in overseeing the ethical problems that most certainly will continue to engage us.
